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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the origin of the ‘Prancing Horse’ symbol, and its role in helping 
the racing team Ferrari survive under the Fascist regime in Italy. Enzo Ferrari, the company’s 
founder, adopted the coat of arms of Francesco Baracca, the most renowned Italian military 
aviator during World War I, as the logo of his new racing team. By repurposing it from military 
aviation to motorsport, he benefitted from powerful cultural associations and strong political and 
cultural endorsement towards Baracca’s persona. Drawing on scholarship on cultural branding 
and consumer culture, this study shows how new companies can establish powerful business 
icons by borrowing symbols connected to populist worlds and national ideologies, and transfer 
them to various industries. Strategic repurposing thus emerges as a distinct process within 
cultural branding to obtain institutional support and establish powerful brand identities in 
challenging contexts. 
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The birth of a business icon through cultural branding: 
Ferrari and the Prancing Horse, 1923 - 1947 
 
Ferrari currently ranks as the most powerful brand in the world.1 Its iconic logo, the 
“Prancing Horse” on a yellow background is univocally associated with Ferrari, and elicits a 
quasi-religious devotion among its fans, who are known as “tifosi.”2 Enzo Ferrari (1898–1988) 
and his legacy progressively built the company’s reputation on narratives of racing success 
obtained by its cars and drivers that have cemented its leadership in the motorsport and luxury 
road car businesses.3 Yet, few recall the military origins of the Ferrari logo, which can be traced 
back to the Italian military aviator Francesco Baracca, a “forgotten hero of the Great War.”4 
Although they were contemporaries from the same region, Enzo Ferrari and Francesco Baracca 
never met in person. When the picture below (Figure 1) was taken on 1 May 1917, Enzo Ferrari, 
the later founder of the namesake car company, was an unknown 19-year-old blacksmith serving 
in the 3rd Mountain Artillery Regiment of the Italian Army. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 It was not until 1923 that Ferrari, at the beginning of his racing career, had the 
opportunity to adopt the Prancing Horse, at the time a symbol of national renown, for his race 
cars, and to use it as his company logo from 1939 onward. A number of historical accounts 
report the events through which Ferrari obtained Baracca’s coat of arms.5 However, no 
systematic exploration has been conducted on the business rationale and potential motivations 
underlying this process within cultural branding , and, in particular, the specific factors enabling 
the successful strategic repurposing of this symbol from aviation to motorsport in support of 
Ferrari’s newly established venture. To understand the significance of the logo in Italy’s interwar 
society and to trace how Ferrari used it to gain a competitive advantage, this article draws on 
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cultural branding literature, specifically Douglas Holt’s concepts for studying iconic brands, 
together with insights from anthropological work by Grant McCracken that established how the 
meaning that culture supplies to the world can be transferred onto consumer goods.6 
More often than not, iconic brands7 emerge through different and idiosyncratic myths and 
stories, some of which are strongly contingent on the contexts where the brands were first 
rooted.8 How to establish this context is of utmost importance because “if brands exist as 
cultural, ideological, and sociological objects, then understanding brands requires tools 
developed to understand culture, ideology, and society.”9 Yet, scholars argue that we are still far 
from unpicking the nuanced, multifaceted interface between brands and society.10 Here historical 
methods of contextualizing the brand within socio-political processes and events can deliver such 
a tool. They allow us to see how redeploying an iconic and meaningful symbol from a cultural 
context or historical period to a business may ultimately establish and reinforce a brand’s unique 
identity based on broader, shared cultural categories. This redeployment can achieve 
differentiation and competitive advantage in fierce markets, valuable for newcomers which often 
have to compete with inferior resources against established incumbents. 11 However, this process 
can present different forms depending on the industry and context where it takes place. For 
example, while most literature has investigated advertising campaigns to explain how this 
process happens for consumer goods (e.g., fashion, sport equipment, soft drinks, spirits, design 
furniture, automobiles), we have little understanding of other business settings (e.g., industrial 
goods, sport industries) or other cases where advertising it not adopted as a tool.  
Our study focuses on the transfer of a symbol from a cultural context to a business setting 
in the form of a logo, thus aiming to explore the underpinnings of this specific, important, and 
yet understudied process within cultural branding.12 Our study argues the success of this 
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operation is due to a process we term strategic repurposing—which can be conscious or 
incidental. The process starts with the transfer of meaning and values from the original to the 
new context and eventually can lead to the replacement of such elements with the firm’s own 
narratives. This may also help the firm to dissolve prior cultural associations with meanings 
which have become undesirable. 
The case of Ferrari in its early years, where the emergence of the cultural icon predates 
the company foundation, is an ideal setting to explore this process through a novel perspective. 
While most studies to date have explored the processes of cultural branding aimed at targeting 
consumers and users, we focus on a phenomenon where the company’s actions instead obtained 
the institutional support of critical non-market stakeholders (i.e., political and cultural elites) at a 
time when Ferrari was not selling road cars. Our analysis thus makes a contribution by looking at 
political context that produces cultural categories and principles to show how a transfer of 
meaning and values from the socially constructed world to a brand can be fundamental in 
securing institutional support for a firm, especially in economic systems with higher levels of 
state intervention.13 In turn, the change in culture after the end of the fascist regime also explains 
why, in the postwar era, Ferrari downplayed the ties between his brand and the meaning 
originally associated with the logo. This might be the reason why today few recall the connection 
of the Prancing Horse with the WWI fighter pilot.  
The source base of this study revolves around two main aspects. First, the life and 
mythologizing of Francesco Baracca and, second, Enzo Ferrari’s adoption of Baracca’s coat of 
arms and the business effects of this operation. The former aspect is explored with the help of 
published war histories and archival documents retrieved from the Military Aeronautics Archive 
of the Italian Army in Rome and the Archive and Library of Lugo di Romagna; materials that 
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bring into focus Francesco Baracca and his myth. Of great importance were the materials of two 
exhibitions, “Cavaliere del Cielo. Il Mito di Francesco Baracca” (“Knight of the Sky. The Myth 
of Francesco Baracca”) held in Bologna in 2015 and “Nel Segno del Cavallino Rampante” (“In 
the sign of the Prancing Horse”) held in Trento from 2014 to 2015. For the latter aspect we used 
a large number of publications and documentaries about the life of Enzo Ferrari and his 
company, including his only autobiography,14 which helped in tracing the pre-history of the 
company before its refoundation under the name “Ferrari” in 1947, marking the point when the 
company begins to manufacture luxury road cars.15 In the period under observation, Enzo 
Ferrari’s activities exclusively focused on motor racing and, during the war years, mechanical 
war supplies. Differently from previous studies with their reliance on advertisement,16 we looked 
at correspondence, newspaper articles, pictures, diaries, and official company documents because 
racing teams of the interwar years lacked the practice of advertising to a consumer base. Our 
method differs further in that we used interviews with present and past company executives, 
experts of WWI history and military aviation, automotive and motorsport historians, literature 
and art experts, as well as museum directors and curators to carefully craft the cultural context 
from which the prancing horse received its iconic status and to trace how the meaning and values 
it symbolized were transferred onto Ferrari’s racing team first and business venture second. 
The article is structured in five parts. First, we introduce the literature on cultural 
branding and explore unresolved aspects related to brand repurposing across different fields. 
Second, we connect the birth of Ferrari’s iconic brand to the historical origin of the Prancing 
Horse as it first appeared on the plane of the aviator Francesco Baracca during WWI, and the 
meaning and values that were associated to Baracca’s persona and coat of arms. Third, we 
discuss the historical context that turned Baracca and his Prancing Horse into an Italian cultural 
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icon: the rise of nationalism, futurism, and irredentism as artistic and intellectual forces, which 
ultimately fed into fascism’s cult of military heroism and sacrifice. Fourth, we explore the facts 
underpinning Ferrari’s adoption of the Prancing Horse and Scuderia Ferrari’s transition from a 
subsidized race team within Alfa Romeo to a fully-fledged and independent company against the 
backdrop of the militarized economy in the fascist period. Finally, we discuss our contribution 
vis-à-vis prior literature on cultural branding. All in all, this study examines the historical case of 
one of the most iconic logos to showcase strategic repurposing as a specific cultural branding 
process that can contribute to the establishment of distinct company identities. 
 
Brands, Icons, and Cultural Branding 
The American Marketing Association defines a brand as a name, term, design, symbol, or 
any other aspect that identifies a seller’s product or service in a unique and distinctive way 
compared to other sellers.17 Branding is considered one of the key factors for business success, 
as it traditionally supports organizations in achieving a unique identity in their stakeholders’ 
eyes.18 The symbolic meanings of a brand may also satisfy customers’ emotional appetites, such 
as the need for self-reflection and social identification.19  
Branding is crucial for organizations in most industries—particularly those strongly 
relying on intangible elements such as identification and hedonic consumption—because it can 
influence the firm reputation and the stakeholders’ loyalty to a firms’ products or services,20 thus 
ultimately enhancing firm performance and sustained competitive advantage.21 Brands—their 
names, terms, designs, symbols, and features which characterize a company’s products or 
services—are progressively less considered as an orchestrated configuration of diverse 
components, but rather as a fluid “process of becoming,”22 a discourse which actively involves 
different public or private agents, individuals, consumers, communities, or business 
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organizations. These actors interact with, appropriate, and continuously (re)shape the brand, its 
kaleidoscopic image, and its perceived identity in the eyes of the different stakeholders. 
Contemporary brands, indeed, are more often than not embedded within and affected by 
cultural contexts and have recently attracted the attention of historians, anthropologist, and 
sociologists.23 Scholars have begun to consider the appeal of a brand as driven by emotions, 
which are at times intentionally, at times intrinsically related to its history and heritage.24 
However, while there is wide acknowledgement and agreement among scholars and practitioners 
that cultural branding matters to enhance brand awareness,25 brand equity, and ultimately firm 
performance,26 scholars lament the lack of theorization on individual processes which underpin 
different operations of cultural branding despite the rich anecdotal literature27 on various cases. 
Our research addresses this phenomenon by asking: how can firms use cultural branding to 
develop a business icon without a consumer good or sustained advertisement?  
Companies are not the only ones developing the brand identity, but they often play a 
fundamental role, particularly in the initial entrepreneurial phases, and in situations when the 
brand is purposefully led through a process of transformation.28 It is important to note, however, 
that building a successful brand likely requires extensive resources and capabilities, which are 
often rare in new firms. Young ventures thus often try to establish their brands by anchoring 
them to existing myths, narratives, renowned or symbolic characters, and a series of events and 
memories which might be meaningful for their key stakeholders. Particularly for exclusive 
luxury brands, unique and powerful associations play a pivotal function in enhancing brand 
equity,29 which is a proxy for the customers’ perception of quality,30 their loyalty,31 and 
willingness to buy.32 
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Creating a brand implies several sub-tasks, such as defining a distinct brand identity, 
connecting it to a set of founding values, and engaging with activities that can support a credible 
and effective establishment.33 But if creating a brand is a complex task, elevating it to a business 
icon is even more challenging. Holt proposes that iconic brands are established by targeting “the 
myth markets currently in play in popular culture … and … most appropriate for the brand.”34 
Three building blocks constitute a myth market: national ideology, populist worlds, and cultural 
contradictions. For our case, helpful categories in thinking through the processes at work in the 
repurposing of the prancing horse logo are national ideology and populist worlds. National 
ideology embodies the values, ethos, and system of ideas that create links between everyday life 
and those of a nation, thus representing the overall moral consensus of a specific society at a 
specific point in time. National ideology is often reflected in myths.35 Populist worlds are formed 
of “groups that express a distinctive ideology through their activities” based on shared ethos and 
motivations for their actions. 36 Populist worlds are especially powerful as they are perceived as 
true, voluntary, and are guided by intrinsic values, not by commercial or political interests—in 
one word, they are perceived as authentic. Iconic brands are often built by members of the 
populist worlds or individuals who are deeply immersed in them. Yet, the brand’s customers are 
often far removed from the populist worlds, hence the association of the brand to the myth 
happens only thanks to the credibility of the narrative which suggests an association to its 
principles.37 Therefore, iconic brands can borrow myths from populist worlds to promote the 
credibility of the associations they suggest and the authenticity of the values they reference. 
Holt’s work focuses on consumer products whose brand emerge primarily from 
storytelling of associated values rather than features of the product itself (e.g., performance, 
innovation, technology). Accordingly, his genealogy methodology relies mainly on ads, which 
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might not be viable for non-consumer products (e.g., industrial products, sports teams etc.) or 
products developed without major use of advertisement. Ferrari’s employment of a cultural 
symbol instead, as we will show, triggered meaningful associations in groups of non-market 
stakeholders whose engagement was critical for the company’s success as they essentially 
functioned as celebrity endorsers. Previous concepts of “celebrity endorsers,” who are commonly 
hired as brand ambassadors for reasons of birth, value, appearance, or accomplishments—
qualities that they “own” and which facilitate the transfer of meaning from the celebrity to the 
advertised product—, have stressed that these celebrities are part of complex marketing 
campaigns as a desirable model to emulate by individuals who enjoy inferior reputation or 
visibility.38 Thus the marketing campaign is the means through which the celebrity’s support of 
the firm and its products is made visible. However, we posit that in situations without 
advertisement such mechanisms can be observed in the cultural context surrounding the 
phenomenon. By making visible the “invisible scaffolding” of cultural categories that provide 
meaning in society, we can trace strategic meaning transfer that repurposes intrinsic values from 
contemporary populist worlds and national ideology to the company as a novel process within 
cultural branding.39 Crucially, the credibility of the transfer motivates celebrities to endorse the 
company as they value its association to a set of authentic meanings that are connected to the 
myth of populist worlds and national ideology.  
In addition, it is interesting to note that certain brands benefit from the association to 
populist worlds for a limited period of time, and later on, once fully established, not only 
dissolve the prior connections to the cultural origin, but consciously replace the original 
meaning.40 This differs from most studies in cultural branding which tend to emphasize the 
importance of continuously nurturing the association with the original myth, its meaning and 
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values. Following this line of inquiry, our work furthers historical investigation of the early days 
of Ferrari, today one of the world’s most iconic brands, to understand how the adoption of the 
Prancing Horse, a popular symbol from a distant context, resulted in a successful strategic 
repurposing supported by the credible transfer of associated values and meanings to the 
company. 
 
The Birth of the Prancing Horse Myth 
Enzo Ferrari was born in Modena on 18 February 1898. He recalled that in 1908, at the 
age of ten, he witnessed race car driver Felice Nazzaro win the “Circuito di Bologna” race, an 
event that inspired him to pursue a career as a racing driver.41 Ferrari acquired most of his 
material understanding and mechanical skills in his father Alfredo’s metal carpentry workshop, 
where he worked during adolescence. After completing little formal education and serving in the 
army during WWI, he found employment at a motor company in Turin, and shortly thereafter 
moved to Milan where he worked for Costruzioni Meccaniche Nazionali C. M. N. (National 
Mechanical Constructions), which converted light trucks into cars. Ferrari was hired as a test 
driver and soon he was promoted to racing driver in 1919.42 In 1921, Enzo Ferrari took part in a 
number of races, gained visibility in the racing community, and eventually was hired to drive 
exclusively for one of Italy’s leading car manufacturers: Alfa Romeo. 
On 19 June 1923—incidentally the day of the 5th anniversary of Francesco Baracca’s 
death—, Ferrari won his first race held at Circuito del Savio, near Ravenna.43 There he met 
Francesco Baracca’s parents, Enrico Baracca and Paolina de Biancoli, who attended the race as 
spectators. Enzo Ferrari and Enrico Baracca quickly developed mutual esteem and friendship.44 
The Baracca family had been regular clients of the Alfa Romeo dealer where Ferrari used to 
work and Ferrari remembered Enrico Baracca as a compassionate and humble gentleman.45 Most 
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importantly, Ferrari (as many Italians at the time) was aware of the legendary reputation 
surrounding their deceased son, Francesco Baracca. 
In his only autobiography, Ferrari mentioned that during the second meeting with the 
Baraccas, the Countess de Biancoli suggested to display her son’s Prancing Horse emblem as a 
lucky charm on Ferrari’s cars.46 There are no documented reasons that reveal the motivation of 
this gift and Ferrari himself never directly addressed them. Other sources speculate that the 
mutual sympathy was based on intertwining life stories, such as the fact that Ferrari was from the 
Modena region where Francesco Baracca had joined the Military Academy, or because Ferrari’s 
older brother Alfredo fell ill and died while volunteering for the ground crew of the 91° 
Squadriglia (91st Squadron), whose most celebrated fighter ace was Francesco Baracca.47 One 
might wonder why the symbol of a military aviator who had been killed in action could be 
considered a lucky charm, or what value a heretofore modest racecar driver such as Ferrari might 
have seen in the unusual gift. However, it is important to remember that anything related to the 
mythic persona of Francesco Baracca became a quintessential symbol of the dominant national 
ideology in Italy. Thanks to a tremendous institutional propaganda effort during WWI, Baracca 
had become a household name since his aviation victories in 1917, which posthumously turned 
into an equally powerful memorialization culture, sponsored by nationalist forces in Italian 
politics and society. 
The aviator and flying ace of the Italian Air Force Francesco Baracca was born in Lugo di 
Romagna (Emilia Romagna region, Italy) on 9 May 1888.48 Francesco was the only child of an 
upper-class family with noble connections. His father Enrico was a landowner and a wine 
producer. His mother, the countess Paolina de Biancoli, was a member of the Italian 
aristocracy.49 Francesco Baracca was an eclectic individual: expert equestrian, skilled motorcycle 
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driver, and advanced cello player.50 Although his family origin could have guaranteed him a 
protected and comfortable life away from the warfront, his patriotism motivated him to pursue a 
military career at the age of nineteen. Already during his education in secondary school, Baracca 
developed a strong interest in the army and, after graduating, he joined the Military Academy in 
Modena where he remained for two years (1907-1909).51 Despite not being particularly fond of 
academic study, he enrolled in and graduated from the “Scuola di Applicazione di Cavalleria” 
(School of Cavalry) in Pinerolo, a small village close to the Italian Alps.52 He then joined the 
prestigious “Piemonte Reale Cavalleria” (Royal Piedmont Cavalry), garrisoned in Rome, where 
he reached the second lieutenant rank.53 
In 1909, the renowned aviator Wilbur Wright had opened a school for airplane piloting in 
Centocelle, Rome, where at the beginning of 1912 Francesco Baracca had the opportunity to 
observe a training session. The experience inspired him to become a military aviator.54 At the 
end of April 1912, Baracca moved to Bétheny, in the canton of Reims, France, where he attended 
a flying school and obtained his pilot’s license that same year.55 During the spring of 1915, the 
Italian army reinforced its aviation equipment with an agile, light aircraft, the French sesquiplane 
Nieuport 10. Fully loaded, these airplanes weighted just 411 kilograms, which made them ideal 
for quick maneuvers, training, and fighting.56 On 23 May 1915 (the day before Italy officially 
declared war and allied with Britain and France), Baracca arrived in Paris where he underwent 
two months of pilot training with these planes. On 8 April 1916, he returned to Italy to initially 
join the 8th Nieuport Fighter Squadron, and subsequently the 1st Fighter Squadron—part of the 
Italian “Corpo Aeronautico Militare”.57 Baracca’s deeds soon became renowned and his 
achievements found important admirers. The Italian King Vittorio Emanuele III himself shot a 
picture of the first enemy plane that Baracca downed on 7 April 1916 (which also was the first 
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WWI air-fight victory for Italy),58 and had the image publicly exhibited in a museum in Udine.59  
War records report that on 11 February 1917 Baracca shot down his fifth enemy, a victory which 
consolidated his fame across Italy. At a time when pilots would hardly survive more than a 
couple of air combats, with an overall record of 34 victories Baracca eventually became Italy’s 
most successful military pilot in WWI.60 
For his service in the Italian military aviation, Francesco Baracca collected an impressive 
number of public recognitions—or endorsements—from high-ranking political “celebrities” of 
the time. For instance, Vittorio Emanuele III himself presented Baracca with a Silver Medal and 
he received the prestigious War Cross from Albert I of Belgium.61. The council of Lugo di 
Romagna gave him the Sword of Honor and he was also the receiver of a special 
acknowledgment during a public celebration at “Teatro Alla Scala” in Milan in 1917. During the 
conflict, Baracca was in total awarded one gold, two silver, and one bronze medals for military 
bravery, and on 6 September 1917 he was promoted to the rank of major by war merit.62 
On 1 May 1917 the 91° Squadriglia, also known as “Squadron of the Aces” was created 
to join all the top aviators in the Italian army—which included, among others, Francesco 
Baracca, Luigi Olivari, Ferruccio Ranza, and Fulco Ruffo di Calabria. Since 1917 the 91° 
Squadriglia allowed its pilots to add their personal emblem to the cockpit.63 This is when 
Francesco started painting the emblem of a black Prancing Horse on a white background on his 
planes (the Nieuport 11; the SPAD VII, and SPAD VIII).64 In a letter sent to his mother on 27 
April 191865 Baracca explained that the emblem was chosen to display his early affiliation with 
the prestigious Royal Piedmont Cavalry regiment.66  
Thus, officially recognized by military and political leaders, both the authorities and his 
family pleaded with Baracca to withdraw from the front. The former were worried by the 
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possibility of seeing their war hero defeated, destroying his—and by extension the nation’s—
aura of invincibility. The latter was concerned about the burgeoning risks and considered 
Francesco’s contribution to the war sufficient to grant him an honorable retirement. Documents 
from Baracca’s private correspondence provide extensive evidence of his mother’s dissuasion 
attempts.67 Still, Francesco Baracca decided to continue his military career, which ultimately led 
to his death.68 Commander Franco Osnago, who was flying with Baracca during his final 
mission, offered the most comprehensive eye-witness account of Baracca’s sole defeat.69 On 19 
June 1918 at 6 p.m. Baracca and Osnago went on a reconnaissance mission in two airplanes over 
the Neveglia, Montello, and “Buso delle Rane” areas near Treviso, Italy. The Austro-Hungarian 
forces positioned in these areas launched a ground attack against the Italian airplanes. Baracca 
was shot dead in flight and his aircraft crashed on Montello hill near Treviso. His body was 
recovered four days later on 23 June 1918.70  
 
Mythologizing WWI Aviation in Italy  
While the battle in the trenches along the mountainous Italian-Austrian border has been 
considered one of the darkest parts of Italian WWI history, the air combats in the skies across 
Europe have evoked images of an epic and chivalrous conflict. Since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, airplanes were internationally admired as magnificent flying machines, and 
narratives presented them as the most advanced military technology to win battles.71 In reality, 
however, military aviation had modest bearing on the outcome of the war, given the small 
number of casualties that airplanes of that generation could inflict on the enemy, and particularly 
when compared to the high death toll of trench warfare. In wartime Italy, aerial combat was 
imbued with idealized militaristic values and ethos that reflected the promoted Italian national 
ideology. The flying aces in particular presented a powerful instrument for nationalist war 
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propaganda and served as heroic role models and symbolic inspiration to motivate the troops at 
the front and the people at home.72 Their courageous deeds and deaths offered a great source for 
vivid narratives, which, thanks to the increasing diffusion of photography, were often enriched 
by spectacular pictures.73  
Artistic expressions of the era, ranging from music to photography and from literature to 
film, echoed the public cult around airplanes.74 The influential ultra-nationalist intellectual and 
celebrated author Gabriele D’Annunzio (1863-1938) was one of the first artists in Italy to 
express his fascination with aviation through poetry, envisioning how aircrafts could change the 
world.75 In a 1910 interview with the Italian journalist Luigi Barzini, D’Annunzio 
enthusiastically described flying as “a new experience, a new essential need. The only thing I can 
think is to fly again soon.”76 His passion for flying was an inspiration for his artistic production 
and as early as 1910 he dedicated his romantic novel “Forse che sì, forse che no” (“Maybe yes, 
maybe no”) to aviators, love, and death.77 D’Annunzio’s nationalist political views aligned with 
the irredentist movement, which sought to unify territories inhabited by Italians and safeguard 
Italian culture from foreign influence. For instance, D’Annunzio famously flew over the 
Dalmatian town of Fiume to release fliers announcing the reign of Italy. In 1915, Italy had 
broken its alliance with Germany and Austria after the Entente Allies promised Italy these parts 
of Austrian Dalmatia densely populated with ethnic Italians. Italy briefly reigned over the 
territory in 1918. But in 1919 the Entente reneged on the agreement, fueling an Italian sense of 
betrayal that would feed into the nationalistic fascist movement.  
The combination of speed and progress that aviators represented also attracted the futurist 
movement. The movement’s program, known as the “Manifesto of Futurism,” published by 
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti in 1909, enthusiastically celebrated emerging technologies such as 
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airplanes and race cars, which were seen as symbols of modernity.78 The main positions 
promoted by Futurism and their early representatives, such as Marinetti, Umberto 
Boccioni, Carlo Carrà, Giacomo Balla, Gino Severini, and Luigi Russolo, encouraged artists and 
intellectuals’ active engagement with broader society and particularly a direct, sometimes 
disruptive, involvement in industry, politics, and business matters.79 Futurists were also 
specifically fascinated by the aesthetics of speed, as Marinetti wrote in the Manifesto: “The 
magnificence of the world has been enhanced by a new concept of beauty; the beauty of speed. A 
racing car with its big tubes similar to snakes on its bonnet is more beautiful than the Nike of 
Samothrace.”80 Alongside the growing fascination with speed and modern technology, aviation 
and with it Baracca, the archetypical Italian aviator and war hero, became the subject of several 
artistic works.81 Eventually, parts of the futurist movement politically aligned with rising 
nationalistic forces in Italy—and the forthcoming changes in national ideology—which in the 
early 1920s would coalesce in the fascist movement under the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF) 
that ruled during the Ventennio Fascista (1922 – 1943).82 Futurist artists contributed to the 
“aestheticization of politics” in early twentieth-century Italy, and especially to the symbolic 
production of fascism. Seeking “a synthesis between nationalism and modernity,” these futurists 
saw in fascism “first a movement, then a regime that was capable of realizing that synthesis by 
instituting a political religion of the nation and creating an ‘Italian modernity’.”83  
Baracca’s victories vividly fit this symbolic production that merged nationalism and 
modernity, eagerly adopted by the Italian press. Official records from the library of Lugo di 
Romagna report more than 400 newspaper articles dedicated to the renowned aviator during his 
lifetime, and an even higher number after his death.84 The numerous photos taken, alongside the 
exposure in the press and the many public events held in his honor, created and spread the legend 
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of Francesco Baracca as the “ace of the aces.”85 Reporters described his fights as authentic 
patriotic gestures, idealized acts of heroism, and extreme commitment to the national cause. 
Baracca’s public image relied heavily on archetypical qualities. Wartime propaganda pictured 
him as a “flying knight” who followed his personal philosophy and moral standard for aerial 
battles, which were likened to duels among gentlemen.86 These reports contributed authenticity 
to the public perception of his persona. Meanwhile, in a more pragmatic way, the point of the 
aerial fights was the defeat of the opponent, which often ended in death. Hence, aviators’ 
reputation reflected their commitment to kill enemies in defense of the fatherland, to follow 
military discipline with respect for hierarchy and orders, and to display bravery in the face of 
death. Baracca’s fascination with adventures and the new possibilities that the numerous 
technological and industrial advances of the time offered have been documented.87 All in all, his 
public persona was inspired by the idea that aviators were destined to be part of an elite, which 
further consolidated Francesco Baracca as the archetypical Italian war hero posthumously.88 
Fascinated with Baracca, D’Annunzio attended his funeral where he gave a solemn speech. His 
tribute to the aviator described Baracca with exceptional celebratory rhetoric.89 The emerging 
remembrance culture surrounding the flying aces, and Baracca in particular, then reinforced not 
only the patriotic feelings of WWI national ideology, but also conveyed positive messages about 
service to the country. 
The deployment of the heroic figure of Baracca continued with the nationalist political 
and artistic movements that emerged from the precarious conditions in which WWI and the 
Treaty of Versailles had left Italy. The effort aimed at mobilizing the masses by using images of 
Italian military greatness, while downplaying the losses and atrocities that accompany warfare. 
For instance, the early interwar governments began to name streets, squares, gentlemen clubs, 
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and sports events in memory of Francesco Baracca—a trend that continued with the advent of 
the fascist regime in 1923.90 Of those the Coppa Baracca (Baracca Trophy), held between 1921 
and 1925, became the most famous sports event, not least because its organizing committee that 
included fascist leader Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) and Gabriele D’Annunzio. The latter 
played a major role in Italian interwar politics and had a strong influence on Mussolini’s political 
thinking—yet D’Annunzio never accepted an official political role with the fascist regime. 
Futurists also contributed to the interwar memory culture surrounding the WWI hero and 
thus to the populist world negotiating the changes in Italian national ideology by mythologizing 
Baracca as an icon in the process. Poet Paolo Buzzi, instructed by D’Annunzio, wrote a sonnet 
dedicated to the speed competition “Raid Aereo” (airplane attack) in 1920, which was published 
alongside two aviator pictures in the brochure of the sport club “Francesco Baracca.”91 Similarly, 
futurist painter Mario Sironi received the commission for the poster for the 1924 Coppa Baracca. 
Other oeuvres inspired by the flying ace include a portrait of Francesco Baracca completed by 
the artist Franco Luchini in 1919 and the 1920 opera “L’Aviatore Dro” (“The Dro Aviator”), 
directed by Francesco Pratella.92 Domenico Rambelli, one of the most famous Italian sculptors of 
the time, was commissioned by the fascist regime to build a commemorative monument for 
Francesco Baracca in Lugo di Romagna’s main square. The construction of the monument—
which still exists today—started in 1927 and was inaugurated on 21 June 1936 under the 
watchful eyes of local PNF representatives. Interestingly, Rambelli decided to design and build 
Baracca’s monument in a wing-shaped form.93 The design recalled a famous line in 
D’Annunzio’s eulogy to Baracca: “His glory was not just a number; but it was a wing over a 
triumphant Italy.”94 In tracing this multi-faceted remembrance culture, it emerges clearly how the 
populist worlds of nationalists, futurists, and fascists engaged in active myth-making to 
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disseminate the cult around Baracca and, simultaneously, to transfer meaning to the desired 
national ideology. The futurists’ idealization of the aviator’s role and D’Annunzio and 
Mussolini’s joint mythologizing of Baracca’s figure manifested the aviator from Lugo as a 
national hero.95 
 
From Wings to Wheels: Ferrari’s Adoption of Baracca’s Prancing Horse Under Fascism 
 
In the totalitarian regimes that rose across Europe during the first half of the twentieth 
century, industries and private business came under government influence to redirect domestic 
production toward national reconstruction, military build-up, and autarchic industrial practices. 
In Mussolini’s Italy, which experienced a number of financial crises in the interwar period, such 
as the 1927 deflation of the lira and the banking crisis in the early 1930s, this step was taken with 
the creation of the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI, Institute for Industrial 
Rebuilding) in January 1933.96 IRI took over the shareholdings of the struggling Credit, Comit, 
and Banco di Roma. “The chain-like nature of shareholding meant that IRI was the major 
shareholder representing some 42% of all joint-stock company capital,” Vera Zamagni 
observes.97 This included Alfa Romeo, at the time arguably the most popular and successful 
Italian race car, but a rather small “artisan” car manufacturer when compared to FIAT which 
held about 90% of the Italian market share.98 It should be noted that most Italians could not 
afford a private car at the time. In fact, there were only just over 200,000 motor vehicles on 
Italian streets by 1929. This indicates that the domestic automobile industry had not yet reached 
the scales of mass production.99 Survival of artisan car makers such as Alfa Romeo, Lancia, 
Bianchi, and Maserati therefore depended on external subsidies, both via funding and 
government contracts.  
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The benefit was mutual, however, because the highly technical environment of car racing 
made it an ideal setting that could showcase industrial development under fascism. By the mid-
1920s, Mussolini, a racing enthusiast, had noted the international prestige that this sport held.100 
In the 1920s and 1930s Mussolini’s goal was to rival and beat the international competitors, 
particularly Germany’s Mercedes. By collecting victories with Alfa Romeo cars, he wanted to 
demonstrate the superior potential of Italian engineering and industrial products.101 In the attempt 
to preserve the image and authenticity of Alfa Romeo as the quintessential Italian car, he 
requested the director of Alfa Romeo, Nicola Romeo, to exclusively buy from Italian suppliers. 
Mussolini complained that several parts of his own Alfa, such as the magnets (German), the 
clock (Swiss), and the malfunctioning horn (French), were imported.102 Eventually, the state 
protected the domestic automotive industry from foreign competition with a legislative bill of 18 
November 1929, “which included the motor industry among those which were of strategic 
importance to national defense and where every single piece of any vehicle sold in Italy had to 
be manufactured in the country.”103 While the majority of autarky policies came in later years, 
this groundwork quickly deepened dependence on the fascist regime among the automobile 
industry and related engineering clusters. The experience of these changes at Alfa Romeo 
possibly played a role in Enzo Ferrari’s decision to start his own company in 1939 and build the 
quintessential Italian racing car that fascism hoped for, while financing racing with supply 
contracts for the government.104 
It is therefore important to understand Alfa Romeo’s business arrangements in the racing 
segment. The Alfa Romeo racing division was run as a “gentlemen driver club,” whose customer 
base—and one of the main sources of funding—traditionally consisted of (usually wealthy) car 
owners and collectors who preferred to drive their vehicles themselves rather than to pay a 
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chauffeur, a common practice among the upper-middle class at the time. However, in most clubs 
a smaller number of talented individuals received payment to race for the club, and since 1920 
Ferrari was one of them. The experience and reputation he gained over the course of the 1920s 
allowed him to establish the “Scuderia Ferrari” in Modena on 29 November 1929, a racing team 
external to Alfa Romeo where gentlemen drivers and track owners subsidized those costs related 
to car racing: buying, tuning, and repairing cars. Scuderia Ferrari rapidly became a technical 
racing outpost of Alfa Romeo, and Ferrari hired several famous figures such as the chief designer 
Vittorio Jano alongside renowned drivers such as Antonio Ascari, Giuseppe Campari, and Tazio 
Nuvolari.105 At this point, nine years after he first obtained it, Ferrari decided to systematically 
adopt Baracca’s emblem. Starting from the 24 hours of Spa-Francorchamps race on 9 July 1932, 
the iconic Prancing Horse logo appeared on every Ferrari car. Yet Enzo Ferrari significantly 
modified the original horse of Baracca over the years: the horse tail was shifted upward, the 
outline was made slimmer, the anterior legs were remodeled, the right rear leg was placed on a 
90-degree angle compared to the body, while the left rear was placed above the name Ferrari (see 
Figure 2).106 The altered logo was then placed on a yellow shield, representing the Italian town of 
Modena, with the Italian ‘tricolore’ flag on top, anchoring the brand locally and nationally, 
respectively.107 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Ferrari retired from professional driving shortly after the birth of his son Alfredo (Dino) 
in 1932. From that moment onward, he focused on the organization and development of what 
was effectively perceived as Alfa Romeo’s racing department.108 Despite its commercial and 
racing successes, Alfa Romeo had struggled financially since its early days. David Owen noted 
that “they had spent too much on sporting success and not enough on sound production cars.”109 
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Therefore, in 1933 Alfa Romeo decided to radically cut back costs for racing, and Ferrari took 
the opportunity to acquire Alfa Romeo’s official racing department.110 This proved to be a fairly 
effective arrangement for the Milanese manufacturer, as it managed to stage competitive race 
cars at little or no cost.111 Around the same time, Alfa Romeo’s financial distress opened the door 
to state intervention via the IRI. This took the form of both direct injection of capital into the 
company as well as a reorganization of its priorities. With aero engine manufacturing (aimed at 
increasing turnover and supporting military armament), car racing, and some special editions 
“Alfa was increasingly expected to enhance the prestige for the regime.”112 The racing 
department also depended on the goodwill of the regime, and in 1934 Ferrari and his mechanics 
became members of the PNF. Enzo’s only living son, Piero Ferrari, later claimed that party 
membership was a prerequisite for traveling to races abroad.113 
Yet at the beginning of 1938, after a few years of successful competitions under the 
banner of Scuderia Ferrari, Alfa Romeo reverted its decision and took its racing department back 
to “Il Portello,” the area of the original company headquarters in Milan. Subsequently, Scuderia 
Ferrari was disbanded and Enzo Ferrari’s role at Alfa Romeo was then reduced to racing 
manager. This was the beginning of a series of disagreements between Alfa Romeo’s executives 
and Enzo Ferrari, which culminated in 1939 with a definitive separation ending 20 years of 
successful collaboration.114 Importantly, the terms agreed upon by the separating parties enforced 
a non-competition agreement that banned Ferrari from building cars branded with his name for 
four years.115 Therefore, Ferrari returned to Modena and founded a new company named Auto 
Avio Costruzioni (Car and Plane Manufacturing).  
After the financial and economic crises at the beginning of the decade, by the late 1930s 
the Italian economy had recovered due to measures such as the 1935 nationalization of foreign 
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investments and the 1936 confiscation of gold possessions among the Italian population on the 
“day of the wedding ring.” With large military orders, industrial output grew by 15 percent in 
1937 and continued to grow until the outbreak of the war.116 Yet, with Italy at the verge of 
entering WWII as Germany’s ally, the situation was anything but promising for companies 
focusing on niche markets. Ferrari’s new venture could not count on any customer base or 
awareness and was born in volatile times for business. Auto Avio Costruzioni needed to find a 
consistent business model that reduced the uncertainty. Enzo Ferrari’s professional experience at 
Alfa Romeo had exposed him to a specific business arrangement, where the high costs of 
racing—which were unsustainable per se, given the modest racing prizes and the lack of 
sponsorships—were subsidized by the government through military contracts, often in the 
aviation industry. As a matter of fact, technologies such as light-weight engines and materials 
were common to both airplane and race car manufacturing, and their symbiosis has served as the 
basis for success of other car companies, such as BMW in Germany, and Rolls Royce and Lotus 
in England. Enzo Ferrari thus approached his first entrepreneurial venture by replicating a 
business model that was incredibly similar to Alfa Romeo’s and combined his traditional racing 
car activities with government commissions for mechanical and aviation supplies. 
This was possible because Ferrari had in place important prerequisites to please the 
fascist regime—now at its acme—as well as broader audiences. His company was based in the 
Emilia-Romagna, the homeland region of Mussolini and fascism. It was also the focal point for 
Italian motorsport, today known as the “Italian Motor Valley.”117 As reported in an interview 
with Piero Ferrari, Enzo admired Gabriele D’Annunzio and shared his patriotic views—thus 
suggesting, to a certain extent, an authentic alignment to the populist worlds which had nurtured 
the national ideology of the fascist period. More importantly, he knew Benito Mussolini 
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personally, as he had met him in 1924 and spent an entire day with him.118 In the same year, the 
Fascist government endorsed Enzo Ferrari and his venture by awarding national honors: the 
‘Cavaliere dell’Ordine della Corona d’Italia’ (Knight of the Italian Crown Order), followed by 
the ‘Ufficiale dell’Ordine della Corona d’Italia’ (Officer of the Italian Crown Order) in 1927, 
and ‘Commendatore dell’Ordine della Corona d’Italia’ (Knight Commander of the Italian Crown 
Order) in 1929. This is a paradigmatic case of “celebrity endorsement” by non-market 
stakeholders, taking place in a politicized setting where institutional support had become a matter 
of business survival. Mussolini and Ferrari met again on 19 August 1932, when the Duce 
received him in Villa Torlonia after the Alfa Romeo racing team won the titles of Italian and 
International Champion at the Coppa Acerbo (Acerbo Trophy) in Pescara. A famous picture 
documents this encounter with Mussolini sitting in the racecar surrounded by Ferrari’s team 
members. And finally, two years later, Ferrari and his mechanics joined the PNF. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Ferrari’s racing team was also known for motorsport success, and thus had become a 
valuable representative of Italianness. Further, it had the possibility to use the famous Prancing 
Horse as its own symbol, and by doing so was able to strategically repurpose values established 
in about 30 years of mythologizing the most acclaimed Italian war hero within a changing 
national ideology. The cultural categories operative at the time favored and even warranted such 
credible associations: fascist nationalism was the dominant ideology, the populists worlds of the 
intellectual and political elites that had sustained the Baracca myth beyond WWI were in power, 
and the “celebrity” endorsement by the political regime was a most necessary requirement for 
business survival.119 Adopting a logo with iconic meaning for local culture and national ideology 
surely facilitated the establishment of the new brand, and when speaking about Ferrari’s adoption 
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of Baracca’s emblem, sources reveal that “Ferrari was certainly shrewd enough to be thinking 
already about the appeal of such connection.”120  
Another reason for such an effective logo redeployment might have been that Ferrari 
credibly portrayed a fit with its cultural meaning: bravery, adventurism, and patriotism. Like 
Baracca, Enzo Ferrari and his family members had served in WWI, and understood the sacrifices 
warfare claimed. Moreover, both racing and air fighting were competitive activities where life 
was at stake for glory. Coming from different socio-economic backgrounds, the middle-class 
Ferrari shared with the upper-class Baracca a common regional origin as they were born within 
the same territory (Emilia Romagna) only 10 years apart.121 Hence, they had been exposed to 
very similar cultural, ideological, and social influences, markers of belonging that were even 
more pronounced in the strong regional identities of the young Italian nation. Both the aviator 
and the race car entrepreneur came from a region where the philosophy, intellectual influence, 
and artistic impulse of a populist world such as Futurism had strongly spread its message since 
the beginning of the twentieth century.122 In the 1920s, several futurists had also lived and 
worked in the Emilia-Romagna, particularly in Modena, one of the major towns in the region and 
Ferrari’s hometown. The Emilia-Romagna not only hosted several futurists but was Mussolini’s 
home region as well. All of these authentic commonalities contributed credibility to the 
association of the two identities—that of Baracca and Ferrari—sealed together by the 
repurposing of the iconic prancing horse symbol. 
Given all of the above, it comes as no surprise that early on Auto Avio Costruzioni 
obtained contracts from the fascist government to support the war production by manufacturing 
aircraft parts, hydraulic grinding machines, ball bearings, and machine tools.123 Two years into 
the war, the government issued an order for Italy’s companies to decentralize and reduce the 
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concentration of production plants in urbanized areas in order to safeguard them from air 
raids. In 1943, Ferrari’s manufacturing plant moved from Modena town center to the countryside 
village of Maranello, which was considered unlikely to be a bombing target. However, probably 
due to its military production, the Ferrari plants were bombed twice, first in November 1944 and 
then in February 1945. 
As many other industrialists during the Fascist Ventennio, Ferrari benefitted from the 
collaboration with the regime, which became problematic during the liberation period. Italian 
republican partisans of Modena accused him of being a supporter of the fascist government and 
threatened his life. His public encounters with Mussolini, party membership, and known dealings 
with the political leadership to ensure his venture’s survival, which were common among Italian 
businesses at the time, provided reason enough for suspicion. Allegedly, Ferrari’s life was 
sparred thanks to the intervention of a friend who paid a ransom of 500,000 lira.124 After the war, 
Ferrari made sure to deny any voluntary collaboration with the fascists and their industrial 
policies. He declared that he had been forced to accept contracts from the regime. What is known 
is that after the registration of the company Ferrari in 1947, Enzo Ferrari has remained vague and 
dismissive about the rationale for the adoption of Baracca’s Prancing Horse. He rather 
downplayed the original meaning of the symbol in favor of establishing independent awareness 
of his company’s brand through racing success and exclusive high-performance road cars. This 
strategy has been incredibly successful, to the point that the overlap with the values and 
meanings of the Baracca myth—so important during the fascist regime—are now, for all intents 
and purposes, forgotten. 
Today, Ferrari’s brand overshadows Baracca’s myth as main identifier for the Prancing 
Horse. For instance, between 1956 and 1961 the racing department of Ducati, a renowned 
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motorcycle producer in Bologna (also in the Emilia Romagna region), adopted the Prancing 
Horse as a lucky charm on some of its racing motorbikes. This was a decision of Fabio Taglioni, 
the Ducati’s chief designer, who (just as Baracca) was originally from Lugo di Romagna. 
Sources report that Taglioni obtained the permission to use the Prancing Horse from Baracca’s 
descendants to celebrate the eminent war hero.125 Interestingly, however, he consistently used the 
icon in Ferrari’s modified version, rather than Baracca’s original version (see Figure 4).126  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
This detail is worth further reflection as it points, in our opinion, to two possible 
interpretations, which both confirm our analysis. The first is that Fabio Taglioni and his entire 
staff were unaware of the significant graphical differences between the two icons and picked the 
wrong one. This would prove that Ferrari’s logo had effectively submerged Baracca’s emblem. 
However, it seems unlikely that an entire team of expert motorsport professionals and enthusiasts 
was unaware of the difference and repeated the same mistake at multiple occasions across 
multiple motorbike models. Particularly, it is hard to believe that Taglioni, being from Lugo di 
Romagna, had not noticed the difference. The second interpretation is that Taglioni was rather 
aiming for an association with Ferrari. Lacking the permission to directly associate Ducati to the 
Ferrari brand and its trademarked logo, he used instead the connection with Baracca as an excuse 
to suggest such association. It is plausible that Ducati’s market positioning as a premium 
motorcycle with a winning race record and equally high commercial ambition sought to benefit 
from the association to the most prestigious Italian racecar, Ferrari, with whom it also shares the 
team color, red. Perhaps most importantly, the motorbikes that Taglioni selected to display the 
Prancing Horse were equipped with a technological innovation, the “desmodromic system,” 
which Taglioni had at the time directly adapted from Formula 1 cars—hence the connection with 
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Ferrari. This system was destined to become one of the distinctive innovations in Ducati 
engineering, which today features in every motorcycle that the company produces. This second 
association with the Prancing Horse underlined concepts like speed, success, and technological 
innovation, rather than military honor, bravery, and discipline. Although the sources offer no 
explanation as to why Taglioni used the “wrong” Prancing Horse, both interpretations support 
our thesis about the effectiveness of strategic repurposing. 
 
Conclusions 
This work adopts a cultural branding perspective to explore the historical case of Ferrari’s 
Prancing Horse logo. It identifies strategic repurposing as a specific process within cultural 
branding, aimed to establish an iconic brand by redeploying a symbol from a domain deeply 
rooted in a society’s cultural and national ideology to a business domain. We have shown that 
the strategic repurposing of cultural symbols to a business domain can support the establishment 
and identification of new entrepreneurial ventures, and it provides a contribution to the 
conversation about the emergence of business icons through cultural branding.  
Cultural branding identifies a general approach to the creation, establishment, and 
development of brands which are derived from and empowered by powerful cultural 
associations. Strategic repurposing presents a specific process within cultural branding, from 
which it borrows some of the traditional concepts and assumptions. Yet, our investigation of 
strategic repurposing allows not only to better detail how cultural branding may happen in 
practice, but also to extend the scope of its applicability to contexts which span beyond consumer 
goods and advertising-based markets—which have been the exclusive focus of cultural branding 
to date. Indeed, our analysis builds on the work on cultural branding and consumer culture by 
investigating how firms can leverage populist worlds to source myths that support the 
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establishment of their brands. The authenticity of the underlying ethos and motivations 
surrounding these populist worlds allows the firm to benefit from powerful associations which 
are imbued in the national ideology of the time. Scholars have extensively used advertising to 
investigate how this process happens for consumer brands. Contemporary or historical populist 
worlds can thus function as a symbolic source that constructs brands.127 For instance, these 
processes have been examined in cultural business histories based on nation branding strategies 
in response to globalization, tracing narratives that developed around important national 
industries, such as Danish furniture, Swiss watchmaking, or Italian fashion.128 Our study extends 
this concept to explore non-consumer brands and it sheds light on some underlying mechanisms 
in industries (such as sports or industrial goods) where advertising may be less prominent, or not 
present at all. This methodological contribution also complements Holt’s “brand genealogy” 
which is, instead, focused on analysis of advertising for consumer goods. In adopting this 
perspective, we narrow down our analysis to the cultural value of symbols for brand identity, and 
we explain how the successful repurposing of the Prancing Horse from aviation to motorsport 
helped build one of the most iconic company logos. We thus provide a granular exploration of 
how cultural branding processes can establish meaningful company logos that support the 
institutionalization of a new venture and help secure its financial sustainability.  
Scholars have also underlined the importance of celebrity endorsers to create imitative 
behaviors that stimulate demand for consumer goods.129 Yet, in our case the absence of a main 
consumer base that could be targeted in such a way to fuel the company’s growth through sales 
shifts the attention to the critical role of institutional actors, such as governments and cultural 
elites. This offered us an opportunity to explore the mechanisms of cultural branding regarding 
this specific type of “celebrity endorsers.” Our study thus brings non-market stakeholders (i.e., 
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government and political authorities, regulators, cultural and intellectual elites) in the 
conversation of cultural branding. We suggest that the strategic repurposing of a symbol 
substantiates one viable option within the broader gamut of non-market strategies (i.e., strategies 
not focusing on actors traditionally involved with the supply or the demand)—a currently 
debated topic in strategy and organization literature.130 We observed how Enzo Ferrari’s 
adoption of the Prancing Horse positioned his venture in close proximity to the cultural 
categories that were valued and promoted by the political and cultural elites of the time. In line 
with McCracken, we acknowledge the intangible nature of such cultural categories, the invisible 
“scaffolding” that provides meaning to the world.131 
The analysis of the cultural and historical context where the strategic repurposing takes 
place allows us to make such invisible scaffolding visible, and it contributes to a rather new 
strand of literature examining the importance of history for claims of brand authenticity.132 
However, this strand uses a different understanding of “authenticity,” which in the cultural 
branding literature would be referred as “credibility”—i.e., the plausible association between the 
populist worlds and the company’s values. Organizational literature on the uses of history has 
established that companies can create an identity and claim credibility—i.e., authenticity in their 
terms—by proxy of “borrowed” history and suggested that historical narrative can be used to 
create a “substantial and sustainable” competitive advantage.133 We echo these claims by 
showing that successful strategic repurposing from the cultural symbol to a brand can have 
important implications for firm survival and competitive advantage.  
The evidence suggests that by deploying Francesco Baracca’s iconic coat of arms from 
military aviation to his motorsport company logo, Enzo Ferrari obtained at least three significant 
advantages. First, he associated his new company, Scuderia Ferrari, to a vivid portfolio of 
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profound aspirational meanings and values, which were originally associated with the Italian 
flying ace: admiration for technology, speed, and fast piloting; the appreciation of heroic, often 
dangerous gestures; and the promise of elevating Italy’s international prestige. Second, the logo 
could early-on enjoy a high level of brand awareness thanks to the exposure that Francesco 
Baracca and the Prancing Horse symbol had received in hundreds of media pieces, artworks, and 
honors dedicated to his persona. This was a valuable endowment for the early days of Ferrari, a 
new venture focused on a niche market, which could not afford an intense and costly advertising 
campaign leading to comparable brand awareness. Third, and perhaps more importantly, by 
adopting a symbol which represented the national ideology and had been largely endorsed by 
populist worlds, which included the political, intellectual, and artistic Italian elite, Enzo Ferrari 
came to enjoy significant institutional support, which allowed him at the very least to continue 
his business activity. Institutional support was expressed materially in personal awards, 
commercial contracts, and brand visibility at a time when the political regime was increasingly 
steering business initiatives in the national economy.  
The case we analyzed presents idiosyncrasies and historical contingencies which needed 
careful contextualization. Ferrari’s opportunity to use the Prancing Horse came thanks to the 
fortuitous and unexpected donation of Baracca family’s coat of arms. Without this event Ferrari 
would not have had the opportunity to launch, nine years later, his own logo as an elaboration of 
the original aviator’s coat of arms. Further, the military aviation and early-days motorsport 
presented features which were at the same time distant but strongly related. Speed, thrill, 
international antagonism, popular enthusiasm, bravery, technological prowess, and life-
threatening risks were aspects that, although with diverging purposes, clearly overlapped across 
the origin in air warfare and the final association to motorsport racing. This overlap provided 
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fertile ground for successful strategic repurposing of a cultural brand, as points of contact 
between the two spheres enhanced the credibility of such transfer of meaning. Scuderia Ferrari’s 
association with Baracca drew on the myth of pioneering aviation and WWI heroic warfare as 
one of the populist worlds of the time. Because of government propaganda and official 
endorsement, this populist world became linked to the cultural principles of interwar national 
ideology. Last but not least, the perceived credibility of the association between the company’s 
values and the specific myth was crucial to the success of Ferrari’s strategic repurposing: both 
Baracca and Ferrari came from entrepreneurial families, had directly experienced the rise of the 
nationalist movements, and had both served in the army during WWI. They had both been 
exposed and influenced by those intellectual and artistic movements which praised speed, racing, 
technology, and action, for which they expressed passion at multiple occasions. Baracca’s family 
was interested in modern car racing and sympathized with Ferrari as a young, successful driver 
from their own region of Emilia-Romagna, while Ferrari endorsed Francesco Baracca’s heroic 
persona. In the consumers’, supporters’, and stakeholders’ eyes the presence of some genuine 
shared interests and values between the two figures contributed credibility and validated the 
transfer of meaning from a cultural domain to a business domain despite involving two activities 
whose pursuit might have appeared, at least on the surface, quite distant. 
Our study thus highlights the importance of strategic repurposing of cultural symbols in 
pursuing and enhancing brand awareness and brand equity, and proposes how a deeper 
understanding of the historical context remains a pivotal aspect for executives and 
entrepreneurs.134 By mastering the cultural categories in which they operate, brand creators can 
interpret the national ideology and have a clear map of the current populist worlds to identify and 
target the best-fitting myth at any particular historical moment.135 The establishment of the 
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Ferrari brand is highly indebted to nationalistic ideas, networks, and social memory that connect 
the main characters of this story—Francesco Baracca, Enzo Ferrari, Gabriele D’Annunzio, the 
futurist intellectuals, and Benito Mussolini. Ferrari’s brand development across the 1943 
armistice divide is an example of historical appropriation and forgetting.  
There is, however, an additional reflection worth mentioning. Because the personal 
archive of Enzo Ferrari is inaccessible, it is impossible to fully establish Ferrari’s agency in the 
repurposing process. Yet, we posit that confirming a conscious, intended strategy is not 
necessary to affirm the dynamics and the impact of this cultural symbol repurposing. In other 
words, the element that shows the significance of Ferrari’s decision to use the Prancing Horse is 
not the premeditation of its potential effects, but rather the effects themselves. Consciously or 
not, Enzo Ferrari’s usage of Baracca’s symbol signaled to the regime that he shared the 
nationalistic ethos and values that were part of the national ideology. In other words, the strategic 
repurposing successfully impacted Ferrari’s institutionalization vis-à-vis the fascist regime even 
if we must, for the benefit of doubt, assume that it happened in a serendipitous, or not fully 
planned way. With this approach we take a departure from the Chandlerian view that emphasizes 
rational entrepreneurs, managerial talent, and leadership. Rather, our study underlines historical 
contingencies in the narrative and instrumentalizes the methodological strength of 
contextualization. 
All in all, while we cannot provide evidence of conscious agency in the associations 
underpinning the strategic repurposing process up to the point of 1943, Enzo Ferrari’s role in 
forgetting the earlier connection to the nationalistic militarism of the fascist years is more evident 
in the postwar period, a time when such national ideology had been condemned and the Italian 
industry no longer needed to ingratiate itself domestically with the regime but instead could 
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compete globally.136 Unlike firms that have used cultural or nation branding strategies to grow 
from local to global brands, Ferrari severed ties to a particular national ideology during a period 
of enormous international growth in the post-fascist era, while succeeding at remaining a 
quintessential Italian brand. In what ways this strategic forgetting allowed the brand to become 








Francesco Baracca in front of his Spad XIII airplane, 1918.  
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Benito Mussolini sitting in an Alfa Romeo race car in 1932.  










The Prancing Horse Logo on the 1960 Ducati 250 GP Desmo at Ducati Museum, Bologna. 
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